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Discrete Monetary Policy Changes 
and Changing Inflation Targets in Estimated
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models
Anatoliy Belaygorod and Michael J. Dueker
1999; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004). The promise
of estimated DSGE models is that one can take the
parameter estimates, plug them into the under-
lying optimizing model, and perform welfare
calculations. In this way, policymakers could
get a handle on the welfare implications of key
features of alternative monetary policy rules,
such as the benefits of interest rate smoothing
or the value of avoiding policy indeterminacy.
Prior to attempting such welfare calculations,
however, it is worthwhile to refine the estimated
monetary policy rule to reduce the scope of the
mis-specification. In this article, we highlight
ways to sharpen the specification of interest rate
smoothing in DSGE models. In particular, we focus
on a key issue that affects inferences regarding
M
acroeconomic models that are
linearized reduced forms of 
dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models with
sticky prices are now widely considered to be
ready for prime time—in the sense that they
can confront the data, yield sensible parameter
estimates, and provide useful policy analysis
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005; Smets
and Wouters, 2003 and 2005; McCallum and
Nelson, 1999). With specific reference to mone-
tary policy, DSGE models have begun to address
two issues: whether policy rules are indetermi-
nate and whether monetary policy rules include
interest rate smoothing (Rotemberg and Woodford,
Many estimated macroeconomic models assume interest rate smoothing in the monetary policy
equation. In practice, monetary policymakers adjust a target level for the federal funds rate by
discrete increments. One often-neglected consequence of using a quarterly average of the daily
federal funds rate in empirical work is that any change in the target federal funds rate will affect the
quarterly average in the current quarter and the subsequent quarter. Despite this clear source of
predictable change in the quarterly average of the federal funds rate, the vast bulk of the literature
that estimates policy rules ignores information concerning the timing and magnitude of discrete
changes to the target federal funds rate. Consequently, policy equations that include interest rate
smoothing inadvertently make the strong and unnecessary assumption that the starting point for
interest rate smoothing is last quarter’s average level of the federal funds rate. The authors consider,
within an estimated general equilibrium model, whether policymakers put weight on the end-of-
quarter target level of the federal funds rate when choosing a point at which to smooth the interest
rate.
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                interest rate smoothing: the discreteness of mon-
etary policy changes. 
In practice, the Federal Open Market
Committee adjusts a target level for the federal
funds rate by discrete increments at their regularly
scheduled meetings or in conference calls. One
often-neglected consequence of using a quarterly
average of the daily federal funds rate in empirical
work is that any change in the target federal funds
rate will affect the quarterly average in two differ-
ent quarters. For example, if policymakers raise
the target by 50 basis points precisely halfway
through this quarter, then the current quarter’s
average will rise by 25 basis points relative to
last quarter and next quarter’s average will also
exceed this quarter’s average by 25 basis points,
all else equal.
Despite this clear source of predictable change
in the quarterly average of the federal funds rate,
the vast bulk of the literature that estimates policy
rules uses a monthly or quarterly average of the
interest rate, yet ignores information concerning
the timing and magnitude of discrete changes to
the target federal funds rate. As a result, such
empirical models end up trying to predict the
effect on the quarterly average of known, past
policy actions rather than including this piece of
data in the forecast information set. Consequently,
policy equations that include interest rate smooth-
ing inadvertently make the strong and unnecessary
assumption that the starting point for interest rate
smoothing is last quarter’s average level of the
federal funds rate. It seems clear, however, that
policymakers would put weight on the end-of-
quarter target level of the federal funds when




One cart-versus-horse issue in empirical
macroeconomics is whether monetary policy-
makers adjust the federal funds rate gradually in
response to developments in the economy or,
alternatively, whether developments in the econ-
omy emerge slowly enough to account for the slug-
gish pace of observed changes in the interest rate.
Sack (2000) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000)
emphasize interest rate smoothing; Rudebusch
(2002) believes that factors omitted from the
empirical policy equation account for the apparent
sluggishness of interest rate changes; English,
Nelson, and Sack (2003) find evidence of both.
The question is whether policymakers overtly
decide to adjust the federal funds rate gradually.
Three reasons have been put forth for rate smooth-
ing and partial adjustment. First, policymakers are
uncertain about the true structure of the economy;
and this potential source of policy error leads them
to act less forcefully than they otherwise would
(Sack, 2000). Second, policymakers are similarly
hesitant to act on initial data releases that are sub-
ject to subsequent revision (Orphanides, 2001).
Third, Woodford (2003a,b) suggests that mone-
tary policymakers can influence market expecta-
tions if they show a willingness to implement—
even through gradual actions—a large interest
rate response if it proves necessary. For example,
suppose that policymakers indicate that they are
willing to raise the federal funds rate by an even-
tual amount of 120 basis points if a 40-basis-point
increase in inflation persists. Policymakers
demonstrate this willingness by embarking on a
path of raising the interest rate gradually. If the
public believes that this gradual path will be
implemented for as long as necessary to reduce
inflation, market expectations will adjust quickly,
with the beneficial effect of reducing inflation
without requiring much actual increase in the
interest rate. Another way to state the Woodford
scenario is to say that interest rate smoothing
raises the unconditional variance of the interest
rate relative to the variance of inflation, and the
latter depends on the expectations of agents.
Faced with this policy, the welfare-maximizing
response of agents is to minimize the variance of
inflation to reduce the realized fluctuations in
the nominal and real interest rates.
DISCRETE TARGET CHANGES AND
INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING
In the standard setup, interest rate smoothing
takes the form
Belaygorod and Dueker
720 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2005 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW(1)
where Rt is the quarterly average of the federal
funds rate and R ˆ is the desired rate based on cur-
rent economic conditions, such as the Taylor
rule–implied level. As discussed here previously,
one shortcoming of equation (1) is that the most
recent quarterly average, Rt, is assumed to be the
reference point for interest rate smoothing, despite
the fact that policymakers are apt to take into
consideration the most recent target level of the
federal funds rate, denoted R
T
t–1. Our empirical
specification of an interest rate smoothing policy
equation would be
(2)     
where δ indicates the weight given to Rt–1 versus
R
T
t–1 in determining the starting point for interest
rate smoothing. An equivalent way to write
equation (2) is
(3) RR R D R R tR t R t R t
T
t =+ − () ++ () − () −− − ρρ ρ 11 1 1 ˆ ,
RR RR tR t t
T
Rt =− ()+     +− () −− ρδ δ ρ 11 11
ˆ ,
RR R tR t R t =+ − () − ρρ 1 1 ˆ , where D = (δ – 1)ρR. Viewed this way, R
T
t–1 – Rt–1
is a discreteness-adjustment term appended to the
basic interest rate smoothing equation. Dueker
(2002) included such a discreteness-adjustment
term in a vector autoregression, and Dueker and
Rasche (2004) included it in an estimated Taylor-
type policy equation. Note that it is possible to
find D > 0, in which case δ > 1. The interpretation
of this result would be that monetary policymakers
do not use either Rt–1 or R
T
t–1 as the starting point
for interest rate smoothing; instead, they use R
T
t–1
+ (δ – 1)(R
T
t–1 – Rt–1),which implies that they
impute some continuation of last period’s target
change(s) in the same direction into this quarter’s
baseline rate. That is, past target changes appear
to imply some momentum for additional changes
in the same direction. We might expect this type
of momentum, given the way policymakers make
relatively long series of target changes in the same
direction. Figure 1 plots the changes in the quar-
terly average, Rt – Rt–1, with the discreteness-
adjustment term, R
T
t–1 – Rt–1, for the federal funds
rate. It is clear from the close correspondence that
Belaygorod and Dueker














Discreteness Adjustment from Time t–1 and Change of Quarterly Average of Federal Funds Rate
at Time tthe discreteness-adjustment term is a predictor
of changes in the quarterly average of the federal
funds rate, based on target changes that took place
in the previous quarter. Consequently, failure to
include this term could affect estimated policy
rules, especially with regard to interest rate




A standard Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) assumes
that monetary policy operates through an interest
rate rule that responds to expected inflation gaps
and output gaps:
(4)  
where r* is the steady-state real rate of interest, π
is inflation, π* is the long-run target rate of infla-
tion, and  is the gap between actual output
and the level implied by the long-run balanced
growth path. The policy rule in a standard DSGE
model assumes a constant inflation target and
subsumes r* and (1 – ψ1)π* together in the con-
stant term:
(5)  
In a general equilibrium setting, a determi-
nacy condition for monetary policy essentially
states that the coefficient ψ1 on inflation exceeds
1.0. Equation (5) suggests that indeterminacy
results when policymakers are not responsive
enough with their interest rate instrument to
changes in inflation. Through the lens of equa-
tion (4), the determinacy condition requires that
monetary policymakers make a positive interest
rate response to an increase in the inflation gap.
Not all increases in observed inflation would
correspond one-to-one with an increase in the
inflation gap if the target rate of inflation were
not constant. To allow some sluggish interest
rate adjustment to be the result of a changing
inflation target and not the result of an indeter-
minate policy—similar to Smets and Wouters
(2003), Gavin, Kydland, and Pakko (2005), Gavin,
ˆ . **
, Rr G D P tt t Rt =+ − ()     ++ + 1 11 2 ψπ ψ π ψ ε ￿
GDP ￿
ˆ , * *
, Rr G D P tt t t Rt =++ − () − () ++ πψ π πψ ε 12 1 ￿
Keen, and Pakko (2005), and Ireland (2005)—we
allow the target rate of inflation, π
T, to vary across
time as an autoregressive process with uncondi-
tional mean π*:
(6)  
which is equivalent to
(7)   
With a stationary autoregressive target rate of
inflation, nominal variables have well-defined
steady-state levels. Yet, there is an additional
reason why the interest rate might be relatively
unresponsive in the face of an increase in inflation:
The inflation might be due to a temporary but
persistent increase in the target level of inflation.
With this additional fundamental shock, επ,t, it is
possible that the parameter estimates differ
enough from those in the restricted model to
increase the posterior odds of determinacy. In
other words, we might not need policy indeter-
minacy to help explain the complex interplay
between the interest rate and inflation if the target
rate of inflation is not assumed to be constant.
THE DSGE MODEL
We log-linearize the New Keynesian monetary
DSGE model from Woodford (2003a,b) and express
variables as deviations from the steady-state levels:
(8)
where z is a technology shock, g is a demand
shock, π
T
t is the target rate of inflation, επ is the
innovation to the target rate of inflation, and εR
is a monetary policy shock. The formal condition
for determinacy in this model is that 
GDP E GDP R E g
E
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time discount factor, is so close to 1 in these
models.
In this paper, we estimate a model enriched
with discreteness correction, D ? –ρR, and a
time-varying inflation target, επ ? 0, assuming
that during the sample period between 1984 and
2004 U.S. monetary policy was determinate—an
assumption supported by a number of empirical
studies, such as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
The discreteness-adjustment term, R
T
t–1 – Rt–1,
which is the gap between the end-of-quarter target
level and the quarterly average of the federal funds
rate, is largely a function of the timing of monetary
policy meetings within a quarter. Other things
equal, the later the meeting at which the target is
changed, the larger will be the gap between the
quarterly average and the end-of-quarter target.
Because the calendar of monetary policy meetings,
while important for forecasting the quarterly
average of the federal funds rate, is not something
we want to determine within the general equilib-
rium model, we treat the discreteness adjustment
as a predetermined variable. In the appendix, we
describe how to handle such a predetermined
variable in the solution and estimation of the gen-
eral equilibrium model. Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) derive a condition with which they express
forecast errors strictly as a function of structural
shocks in a determinate model. We want the pre-
determined variable, which is dated t–1, to affect
only expected values at time t, not forecast errors,
because rational expectations forecast errors are
orthogonal to everything in the current informa-
tion set. The mechanics of imposing this condition
are spelled out in the appendix. In fact, these
methods for dealing with predetermined variables
are used in DSGE models of small open economies
(Kollmann, 2001 and 2002), where rest-of-world
variables are decomposed into expected and
unexpected components. However, the DSGE
solution methodology implemented in this liter-
ature is based on the older approach attributed
to Blanchard and Kahn (1980). In this paper we












for solving DSGE models attributed to Sims (2002).
It is important to make the following distinction
here: While one of the main improvements of Sims
(2002) over Blanchard and Kahn (1980) is the
handling of the endogenous predetermined vari-
ables (which are elements of the state vector),
our generalization of Sims (2002) comes from
adding exogenous predetermined regressors.
Obviously, by definition of being exogenous, such
regressors cannot be elements of the state vector
because the dynamics of their evolution are
determined exogenously (outside this model’s
specification).
The quarterly data are gross domestic product
(expressed in logs as the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered
deviation from trend), inflation (measured as the
percentage change in the personal consumption
expenditures chain-weighted deflator), the quar-




t–1 – Rt–1, where t = 1984:Q2,…,2004:Q2.
In the appendix, we describe how the DSGE solu-
tion procedure of Sims (2002) can be extended
to handle predetermined variables, such as the
discreteness adjustment, ∆t–1. We chose post-1984
data because we wanted a time period when U.S.
monetary policy was unambiguously determinate.
Data on a target federal funds rate are available for
earlier time periods, although the exact dates and
magnitudes of target changes are open to debate.
We use Kalman filter recursions to evaluate
the likelihood function of the data. We apply
Bayesian and maximum-likelihood estimation to
this model. Our objective is not only to find the
point estimates of the parameters, but also to plot
the entire marginal posterior distribution for
parameters of interest. This objective could be
accomplished only in a Bayesian framework.
Whether the Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) posterior densities look like the asymp-
totic normal distributions implied by maximum-
likelihood estimation is an empirical question.
Although Bayesian MCMC methods converge
faster if supplied with the true maximum-
likelihood parameter estimates and a smooth
function surface, it is not a matter of necessity for
the MCMC methods to work. To the extent that
our proposal density is off the mark, our MCMC
Belaygorod and Dueker
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more draws, but the results will still be valid.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
For this sample period, we restrict the param-
eter space to the determinacy region. This restric-
tion should not contradict the true distribution of
the parameters in the post-1984 sample period.
Table 1 presents the Bayesian MCMC parameter
estimates for the full model estimated using a
tailored Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm
(Chib and Greenberg, 1994).1 For brevity, we do
not report standard errors for the maximum-
likelihood estimates because, for all four model
specifications reported in Table 2, standard devi-
ations are very close to the corresponding values
in Table 1. A key result is that, while both addi-
tions to the basic model—the discreteness adjust-
ment and the time-varying inflation target—affect
the parameter estimates relative to the basic
model, especially in terms of reducing σR, the
constant inflation target specification essentially
does not change any other parameter within the
full model. Thus, if one had to choose between
dropping either the discreteness adjustment or
the time-varying inflation target, the discreteness
adjustment would be the one to keep. At the same
time, both the discreteness adjustment and the
time-varying inflation target yield lower estimates
of the interest-sensitivity of output (lower τ) and
a steeper Phillips curve (lower κ), relative to the
basic model. The discreteness adjustment reduces
the estimates of these two parameters below that
which the time-varying inflation target would
imply alone.
The remainder of our discussion of the
parameter estimates focuses on Bayesian MCMC
estimates of the full model, for which we report
standard deviations in Table 1. We also include
plots of the smoothed normalized marginal pos-
teriors (superimposed with the corresponding
priors2) for key parameters because such output
is much more informative than point estimates
and asymptotic standard errors. In addition, when
forecasting, or drawing inferences about the latent
variables, such as the target rate of inflation, we
are not limited to point estimates of the parame-
ters; instead, we can study the entire distribution
of parameters and latent variables. We used this
approach to estimate the dynamics of the latent
inflation expectations and inflation target (see
Figure 2).
The posterior means from the MCMC algo-
rithm are close to the maximum-likelihood esti-
mates. The very tight distribution for σR shows
that the basic model unambiguously forecasts the
quarterly average of the federal funds rate worse
than the enhanced model does. Thus, it clearly
behooves models to take into account the effects
of recent target changes when forecasting the
Belaygorod and Dueker























NOTE: 10,000 M-H iterations including 10 percent burn-in.
M-H algorithm elapsed time was 55 seconds.
1 See Chib (1995, 1996, and 2001) for detailed discussion of the M-H
theory and implementation.
2 We used exactly the same priors as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
for all common parameters.Belaygorod and Dueker
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Table 2
Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates for the Full Model and for Three Reduced Models
No discreteness 
No discreteness  Constant  adjustment and 
Parameters Full model adjustment inflation target constant inflation target
τ 0.25649 0.33904 0.25155 0.47566
β 0.98987 0.99002 0.98986 0.99000
κ 0.41184 0.57857 0.42309 0.80306
ψ1 2.23232 2.41409 2.22892 2.37387
ψ2 0.27812 0.28805 0.25515 0.27423
ρπ 0.80691 0.67133 0.00000 0.00000
ρR 0.89177 0.78397 0.90167 0.83369
ρg 0.86592 0.86562 0.86471 0.88184
ρz 0.71581 0.75238 0.71162 0.72691
D 0.21510 D = –ρR 0.12513 D = –ρR
π* 2.58790 2.42552 2.54855 2.40189
r* 1.68736 1.91675 1.82423 1.93581
σ σR 0.08070 0.08897 0.09317 0.14872
σz 0.69329 0.59847 0.69992 0.60681
σg 0.10262 0.12009 0.10212 0.11823
σπ 0.18525 0.35018 0.00000 0.00000
ρgz 0.84009 0.89611 0.80383 0.83375
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Figure 2
Time-Varying Inflation Target, Expected and Actual InflationBelaygorod and Dueker






























































Slope of Phillips Curvechange in the quarterly average of the federal funds
rate. Another key result concerns the estimate of
the discreteness-adjustment coefficient, D. The
estimate of D = 0.198, with a standard deviation
of 0.15, matches the estimates of D from a vector
autoregression in Dueker (2002) and from a single-
equation Taylor rule in Dueker and Rasche (2004).
From the posterior histogram in Figure 3 we see
that the posterior mass lies above zero and “light
years” above D = –ρR, which is what the standard
model without the discreteness adjustment would
impose. Figure 3 illustrates that the coefficient
on the discreteness adjustment, which has a dis-
tribution centered at 0.20, has a posterior distri-
bution that is determined by the data. The prior
distribution is centered at zero and is quite diffuse.
Nevertheless, the data are strong enough to move
the posterior distribution to the right tail of the
prior, although not by enough to rule out D = 0.
Recall that, when D = 0, the starting point for
interest rate smoothing is the end-of-quarter tar-
get level of the federal funds rate. The fact that
considerable probability mass lies above zero
indicates that one expects some continuation of
last period’s target changes.
The posterior plot of the discount factor, β
(Figure 8), shows that very little probability mass
lies above 1.0. Thus, unlike Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) and others, we did not have to tie β, the
rate of discounting the time-separable utility, to
other steady-state parameters to infer a value
below 1.0. The posterior plots for τ and κ, found
in Figures 5 and 6, respectively, show that the data
shift the posterior to the left of the prior in the
presence of the discreteness adjustment. Thus,
the discreteness adjustment leads to the conclu-
sion that monetary policy faces a flatter Phillips
curve than the basic model would suggest.
From the posterior plot on Figure 7 we see
that the feedback parameter from the inflation
gap, ψ1, shows that the posterior distribution is
unambiguously above 1.0. That is, the data
strongly support monetary policy determinacy
in the post-1984 period.
We turn next to our estimates of the time-
varying inflation target. The time-varying inflation
target inferred from the data has an unconditional
mean of about 2.5 percent, and its deviations are
persistent, with an autoregressive coefficient of
ρπ = 0.78. Figure 2 plots this model-implied infla-
tion target against actual inflation and model-
implied inflation expectations. During this sample
period, the model-implied inflation target often
moved in the same direction as actual inflation.
Belaygorod and Dueker
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Household Discount FactorTarget and actual inflation have a positive corre-
lation (0.65), but it is still much lower than the
0.96 correlation between actual and expected
inflation.
IMPULSE RESPONSES
Impulse response functions illustrate the
different economic implications of the models
specified with and without the discreteness
adjustment. In order to calculate an impulse
response for the model with the discreteness
adjustment, it is necessary to make some assump-
tions concerning the interaction between the target
federal funds rate and the effective federal funds
rate. The first assumption is that in the simulated
quarters the Federal Reserve achieves on average
its target for the daily effective rate. The second
is that the starting point for the impulse simula-
tion is one where the effective rate equals the
target. For the third assumption, we consider
two cases: one where the federal funds target is
shocked halfway through a quarter (the empiri-
cally relevant case) and one where the target is
shocked at the very beginning of the quarter. The
latter case facilitates a comparison between the
coefficients pertaining to models estimated with
and without the discreteness adjustment. These
timing assumptions pin down the response of the
discreteness adjustment, R
T – R, to an interest rate
shock. With these assumptions, at the time of the
interest rate shock, the change in the quarterly
average equals (1 – λ) times the change in the
target, where λ is the portion of the quarter that
has elapsed when the target shock occurs. Thus,
the change in the discreteness-adjustment term
(R
T – R) in response to an interest rate shock equals
λ/(1 – λ) times the size of the shock.
When the simulated target change is assumed
to take place right at the beginning of the quarter
such that λ = 0, the discreteness-adjustment term
does not enter the impulse response and the only
difference between the models with and without
the discreteness adjustment is that the estimated
coefficients differ, depending on whether D is
restricted to zero. The impulse responses corre-
sponding to the case where λ = 0 are shown in the
left-side panel of Figure 6. They show that, even
when the simulated target change takes place at
the beginning of the quarter, such that no gap is
opened between the quarterly average and the
target rate, an interest rate shock is estimated to
have a larger impact in the model estimated with
the discreteness adjustment.
The case where λ = 0.50 has greater empirical
relevance because, from 1984 through 1993, 50.1
percent of the weighted mass of target changes
took place in the second half of the quarters, on
average, and from 1994 through May 2005 the
same measure is 52.2 percent. The impulse
responses for these models stem from equation
(A3) in the appendix, which shows that when the
discreteness adjustment is omitted from the model,
then the impulse responses are those of a first-
order vector auto regression, VAR(1). The effect
of the discreteness adjustment is to change the
structure of the model to include a moving average
component—a VARMA (1,1). The additional
response comes from the discreteness-adjustment
term, where the response is proportional to 
λ/(1 – λ), as discussed above. Consequently, the
impulse responses from the VARMA (1,1) speci-
fication will show an extra kink from the moving-
average component. 
The left panel of Figure 9 shows the discrete-
ness adjustment leads to estimated coefficients
that imply stronger impulse responses (in absolute
value) to a monetary policy shock, relative to the
model without the discreteness adjustment. The
right-hand panel of Figure 9 shows that the dis-
creteness adjustment does what it is supposed to
do. A 100-basis-point shock to the target federal
funds rate eventually has the same effect—whether
it is implemented at the beginning or the middle
of a quarter—once it is fully reflected in the
quarterly average. This equivalence holds because
the model with the discreteness adjustment accu-
rately predicts the consequences of a mid-quarter
target change for the quarterly average. The model
without the disceteness adjustment, in contrast,
would treat the change in the quarterly average
in the subsequent period as a surprise. In this
context, the VAR(1) structure of the DSGE model
acts as a limitation because Dueker (2002) showed
Belaygorod and Dueker
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Response of Output to Monetary Policy Shock When 
100-Basis-Point Target Change Occurs at Beginning of Quarter
Response of Output to Monetary Policy Shock When 
100-Basis-Point Target Change Occurs in 
Middle of Quarter vs. Beginning of Quarter
Response of Federal Funds Rate to Own Shock When 
100-Basis-Point Target Change Occurs in 
Middle of Quarter vs. Beginning of Quarter
Response of Federal Funds Rate to Own Shock When 
100-Basis-Point Target Change Occurs at Beginning of Quarter
Response of Inflation to Monetary Policy Shock When 
100-Basis-Point Target Change Occurs at Beginning of Quarter
Response of Inflation to Monetary Policy Shock When 
100-Basis-Point Target Change Occurs in 
Middle of Quarter vs. Beginning of Quarter
Without Discreteness Adjustment
With Discreteness Adjustment Beginning of Quarter
Middle of Quarter




















Impulse Response Functionsthat the federal funds rate equation in a higher-
order VAR can imply the hump-shaped response
of the quarterly average to its own shock. The
conclusion is that, since many linear DSGE models
imply a first-order VAR structure, it is even more
important to include the discreteness adjustment
than it is in higher-order nonstructural VARs. 
CONCLUSIONS
We have made a key enhancement to the
Taylor-type monetary policy equation analyzed
in estimated DSGE models: We allow the interest
rate smoothing to start at a point other than last
quarter’s average because last quarter’s average
does not fully reflect the discrete target changes
policymakers made in that quarter. Our estimates
indicate that the starting point for interest rate
smoothing is the end-of-period target federal funds
rate plus a small degree of momentum built into
the starting point. This enhancement leads to a
dramatic fall in the standard error of the interest
rate equation on the order of 40 percent. Thus,
previous conclusions regarding determinacy and
the degree of interest rate smoothing are subject
to omitted error bias in the absence of such a dis-
creteness adjustment. We also find that the impor-
tance of allowing for a time-varying inflation
target is greatly reduced in our post-1984 data
set, provided that the discreteness adjustment is
included. Without the discreteness adjustment,
the time-varying inflation appears to be an indis-
pensable feature of the data. 
The discreteness adjustment also leads to
lower estimates of the interest sensitivity of output
and a flatter estimate of the Phillips curve, relative
to the baseline model. On balance, monetary pol-
icy would appear to have more influence on the
behavior of the real economy when one accounts
for the discreteness of monetary policy actions.
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THE DSGE MODEL SOLUTION WITH PREDETERMINED EXOGENOUS
REGRESSORS
Sims (2002) introduces a general method for solving DSGE models. Here we show how to adapt
his solution methodology to the same setup enriched by the presence of predetermined regressors.
Consider a DSGE model of the following canonical form:
(A1)
where, at time t, st is the vector of state variables, εt is a vector of structural shocks, ηt is a vector of
expectational errors, ∆t–1 is a vector of predetermined regressors (not present in the model considered
by Sims, 2002) and Γ0, Γ1, C, Ψ, Π, D are parameter matrices.
Following Sims (2002) we apply a generalized Schur QZ decomposition, (Γ0,Γ1) = (Q′ΛZ′,Q′ΩZ′);
partition the resulting system into non-explosive (denoted by subscript 1) and explosive components
(denoted by subscript 2); and use “solution uniqueness” and “stability” conditions worked out in
Sims (2002) to write 
(A2)                                 
where ω(t) = Z′st, Φ = Q1Π(Q2Π)
–1 and I,0 denote identity and zero matrices, respectively, with dimen-
sionality easily deduced from the preceding equation.
Therefore, the solution to the DSGE model in equation (A1) could be written as
(A3)                                                       
where Θ1,Θc,Θ0 were derived in Sims (2002) and are identical to those variables in our expanded model.
The coefficient D
* can be found by focusing on the last term in equation (A2):
(A4)                           




–1Ψ, then we can use equations (A3) and (A4) to find that3
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3 If Γ0 is not invertible, we can still use its generalized Schur decomposition representation to carry out this analysis using more clumsy
notation in terms of partitions of Q, Λ, Z as in Sims (2002).All this time Ψεt and D∆t–1 were treated symmetrically in the derivations just noted, and as a result the
final formulas noted previously look the same: The new coefficient equals (Γ0)
–1 times the old coefficient
plus correction for expectational error coming from the “solution existence” condition:
(A6)                                                           
which allows us to solve for expectational error as a function of structural shocks, predetermined
regressors, and parameters:
(A7)                                                
However, there is an important distinction between structural shocks and predetermined regressors.
We require that expectational errors depend only on the shocks and are independent of predetermined
regressors. From the econometric prospective, this requirement amounts to setting the coefficient on ∆
in the regression of η on ε and ∆ to zero:
(A8)                                                                      
Then, the equations in (A5) become 
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